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Abstract
We propose and study a stochastic binary opinion model where agents in a group are considered to hold an opinion of 0 or
1 at each moment. An agent in the group updates his/her opinion based on the group’s opinion configuration and his/her
personality. Considering the number of agents with opinion 1 as a continuous time Markov process, we analyze the long-term
probabilities for large population size in relation to the personalities of the group. In particular, we focus on the question of
“balance” where both opinions are present in nearly equal numbers as opposed to “dominance” where one opinion is dominant.
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1 Introduction
The study of opinion dynamics focuses on decision
making process in multi-agent systems. This line of re-
search dates back to 1950s [9]. Since then, the study
of opinion dynamics has attracted researchers from di-
verse areas, and hence various approaches have been
proposed for modeling of the evolution of opinions [3].
It is natural to assume that an agent’s decision mak-
ing process is influenced by the information he/she
receives from the society. The influence of society has
been considered in the form of the agent’s interactions
with his/her “neighbors.” An agent’s neighbors can be
chosen based on the agent’s opinion [25,2,12,13,4] or
based on a given communication graph independent of
the opinions [6,16,10,4,1,15,29,27]. The set of possible
opinions of a given agent at a given time may be re-
garded as a finite discrete set without any additional
structure, the simplest example being a binary set
[1,15,29,27,14,23,11,30,19,18,21], or alternatively as a
continuum of values in R or Rd [25,2,12,6,28]. The struc-
ture of the Rd imposes a concept of nearby opinions and
leads to the notion of confidence bounds where an agent
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may only interact with other agents within his/her con-
fidence bound. See for instance [12,2,13,25,4]. In this
paper, we shall focus on the binary opinion case and as
such the notion of bounded confidence does not apply.
See [1,15,29,27,14,23,11,30,19,18] for binary opinion
models.
One simple way an agent can choose to update his/her
opinion would be by interacting with his/her neighbor(s)
and adopting the opinion of the neighbor or the leading
opinion of the group of neighbors [14,23,11,30]. It is im-
portant to note that this opinion updating rule assumes
that agents conform to the neighbor(s) with whom they
are interacting, and hence it does not take agents’ per-
sonalities into account. In this respect, [19,29,11,26,24,5]
and references therein introduce agents with personali-
ties. [29,11] include stubborn agents who do not change
their opinion, however, influence other agents. Indepen-
dent agents who change their opinions independent of
the interactions are considered in [26]. As a special case
of independent agents, zealots are introduced in [19].
Zealots are independent agents who may favor one opin-
ion. [11,24,5] study contrarian agents who adopt the op-
posite of the leading opinion with a certain probability.
The effect of contrarians and independent agents to the
group’s limiting behavior are discussed in [20]. The pres-
ence of leaders is considered in [7,18,15].
It is natural to focus on two possible extreme outcomes:
balance of opinions and consensuswhere all agents agree.
Preprint submitted to Automatica 13 August 2019
In reality, the situation is not “black or white”; for in-
stance, one may find that in the long-term, one opinion
is likely to be held by say 70% of the agents resulting in
dominance of one opinion. The idea of balance of opin-
ions and dominance of opinions are explored in [11,19,27]
in discrete time setting in relation to the personalities of
agents.
In this study, we propose a continuous time binary opin-
ion model (say 0 or 1) for a group in which agents are
considered to have personalities defined by a monotonic
function and a spontaneity coefficient. An agent’s per-
sonality determines the effect of social influence on the
agent (e.g., conformists, rebellious). Moreover, in our
model, contrary to the pair-wise interaction of agents
that are defined to be neighbors, agents are considered to
be informed on the distribution of opinions in the entire
group at each time t. We investigate various personality
traits and their effect on the group’s limiting behavior
for a large number of agents. In particular, the person-
ality traits that lead to dominance of one opinion is our
main interest. We note that, our model can be thought
of as the result of a situation where agents do not change
their mind after one (pairwise or group) interaction, but
rather after several interactions. In this case, assuming
all agents can interact with all others, in a large popu-
lation an agent interacts with sufficiently many others
before changing their mind and the sample from the suf-
ficiently many can be taken as a good approximation of
sampling the entire population.
We also assume (as is done in other models) that there
is no “natural bias” towards one of the opinions. As an
example, if the opinion is about whether the earth is flat
or not, one would expect that in an informed society,
agents are more likely to believe the truth. We are fo-
cused on the long-term probability distribution for the
number of agents with opinion 1 when the number N of
total agents is very large. In particular, we study the ef-
fects of agents’ personalities on balance and dominance
of the opinions. We found that the shape of the so called
conformity function plays an important role.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we in-
troduce our binary model and focus on a homogeneous
group. In section 3 we study the effects of personality
of the (homogeneous) group on the group’s limiting be-
havior. We extend our model to heterogeneous groups
and examine limiting decision behavior when the group
is formed by two extreme personality classes in Section
4. The concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
2 The model and the homogeneous case
We consider a group ofN agents where each agent holds
an opinion from the set {0, 1}. An agent flips his/her
opinion based on the group’s current configuration and
his/her personality. Here, personality of an agent i, i =
1, . . . , N , is given by the pair (φi, βi) where φi : [0, 1]→
[0,∞) is a monotonic function that accounts for con-
formity, βi is a nonnegative quantity that accounts for
spontaneity. We call a group homogeneous if all agents
in the group share the same personality, φ = φi, β =
βi ∀i = 1, . . . , N . We first look at the case when the
group is homogeneous.
We define XN(t) to be the number of agents holding
opinion 1 at time t ∈ [0,∞) and assume that a given
agent flips his/her opinion during a time interval (t, t+h]
with a probability
(φ(n/N) + β)h+ o(h) h→ 0+, (1)
where n is the number of agents with opposite opinion
and N is the total number of agents at time t. Thus we
note that φ(x) determines the rate of conformity where
x is the fraction of the population holding the opposite
view. We note that the pairwise interaction model is
a special case of our model where φ is linear, that is
φ(x) = αx for some α > 0.
This results in a Markov process model for XN(t) with
the state space {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. Moreover, we regard
XN(t) as a birth-death process since when an agent
flips his/her opinion, the process increases/decreases
by one. Using the rate of opinion change for an agent
defined by (1), the birth rate λNi and the death rate µ
N
i
at the state XN(t) = i can be written as follows:
λNi =
(
φ
(
i
N
)
+ β
)
(N − i) = (N − i)φ
(
i
N
)
+ β(N − i),
µNi =
(
φ
(
N − i
N
)
+ β
)
i = iφ
(
N − i
N
)
+ βi. (2)
Since the state space {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} is finite, λNN =
0 and µN0 = 0. Using these transition rates one can
construct a transition rate matrix QN = [qNij ], where
qNi(i+1) = λ
N
i , q
N
i(i−1) = µ
N
i , q
N
ii = −
∑
j 6=i q
N
ij and q
N
ij =
0 ∀j /∈ {i− 1, i, i+ 1}.
We may rewrite the birth rate λNi and the death rate
µNi as follows:
λNi = Nλ¯
(
i
N
)
,
µNi = Nµ¯
(
i
N
)
i = 0, 1, . . . , N,
(3)
where λ¯, µ¯ : [0, 1]→ [0,∞) are given by
λ¯(x) =(1− x)φ(x) + β(1− x),
µ¯(x) =xφ(1 − x) + βx. (4)
2
Wedefine the probability pN (t) = (pN0 (t), p
N
1 (t), . . . , p
N
N(t)),
where pNi (t) = P[X
N(t) = i] for each i = 0, 1, . . . , N .
The probabilitymass function satisfies theKolmogorov’s
forward equation
p˙Nj (t) =
∑
k
pNk (t)q
N
kj . (5)
It should be noted that when spontaneity coefficient
β = 0, the states i = 0 and i = N are absorbing states
since λN0 = µ
N
N = 0. When β > 0, the birth-death pro-
cess XN(t) is an irreducible Markov process with the
finite state space {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} and thus, XN(t) is er-
godic and attains a unique stationary probability distri-
bution as t→∞. The probability vector pN (t)→ πN =
(πN0 , π
N
1 , . . . , π
N
N ) as t → ∞ and πN does not depend
on the initial state XN(0). Using the detailed balance
condition at stationarity, one can obtain
πNn =
λNn−1λ
N
n−2 . . . λ
N
0
µNn µ
N
n−1 . . . µ
N
1
πN0 , n = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Hence,
πNn =
RNn∑N
k=0 R
N
k
, n = 0, 1, . . . , N. (6)
πN0 =
1∑N
k=0 R
N
k
, (7)
where
RNn = r
N
n r
N
n−1 . . . r
N
1 , n = 1, 2, . . . , N (8)
for rNn =
λNn−1
µNn
and RN0 = 1.
3 The effects of the conformity function : The
homogeneous case
In order to study XN (t) for large N and t, we shall
consider the normalized process XN (t) =
XN (t)
N . As
N →∞, in the fluid limit, one expects XN to converge
to x where x satisfies the ODE
x˙(t) = F (x(t)) = λ¯
(
x(t)
) − µ¯(x(t)), (9)
where
F (x) = φ (x) (1− x)− xφ (1− x) + β(1 − 2x). (10)
Intuitively, whenN and t are both large, one expects the
peaks of the probability distribution of XN(t) to occur
near the stable equilibria of this ODE. This observation
will motivate the rest of the analysis in this paper.
While we do not make new claims about rigorous limits
as t→∞ andN →∞ jointly, some rigorous limits exist
in literature that we mention here. A major result is that
if F is C1 (continuously differentiable), then given any
finite time interval [0, T ], as N →∞ XN → x uniformly
on [0, T ] with probability one, and moreover a diffusion
approximation for XN is also available [8]. Since this re-
sult only considers the limit as N →∞ over finite inter-
vals of time, one needs to be cautious in interpreting the
large N and large t approximation. In particular, if one
fixes any large final time t, and considers increasing N ,
then one expects distributions at time t to have peaks
around the stable equilibria of the ODE. When F has
a unique globally attractive equilibrium x, under suit-
able conditions, as N → ∞ one can rigorously justify a
Gaussian approximation with mean x for the stationary
probability distribution (see Theorem 2.7 in [17]).
Henceforth, we shall study the system (9) for its stable
equilibria. We note that F (0) > 0, F (1) < 0 and x = 12
is always an equilibrium for the dynamics (9). If x = 12 is
the unique equilibrium, it will be globally attractive on
[0, 1]. Then, for very large N , the stationary probability
distribution will be a narrow Gaussian with mean x and
hence, the model leads to balance of opinions.
We shall see that the shape of the conformity function
φ plays an important role in deciding if dominance of
an opinion is likely. Intuitively, one may expect that
greater conformity leads to dominance of one opinion
while greater spontaneity leads to balance of opinions
via a law of large number effect. However, our examples
suggest that the dependence on φ is more subtle in that
the shape of the function plays a crucial role.We see that
when φ is strictly convex, for sufficiently small β domi-
nance is observed. When φ is not strictly convex or if it
is concave, we do not see dominance in our examples.
Remark: For the sake of precision, we shall use the term
balance to mean the situation where there is only one
stable equilibrium of (9) which is x = 1/2. We shall use
the term dominance rather loosely to stand for lack of
balance.
In order to investigate the effects of φ, it makes sense
to make some natural assumptions. The most natural
conditions on φ : [0, 1]→ [0,∞) are that φ(0) = 0 and φ
is increasing for conformity, and φ(1) = 0 and decreasing
for rebelliousness (opposite of conformity).
Theorem 1 Consider conformity function φ(x) :
[0, 1] → [0,∞) such that φ′(x) strictly increasing on
(0, 1) and suppose that φ(0) = 0. Then for sufficiently
small β, the equilibrium x = 1/2 is unstable and hence
the model leads to dominance of one opinion for large N
and large t.
Proof 1 Define G(x) = φ(x)(1− x)− xφ(1− x). Then,
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the vector field (10) is
F (x) = G(x) + β(1− 2x).
We note that G(0) = G(1/2) = G(1) = 0. We note that
F ′(1/2) = G′(1/2)− 2β, and that
G′(1/2) = φ′(1/2)− 2φ(1/2).
Using the mean value theorem for φ(x) on [0, 1/2], we
conclude that for some c ∈ (0, 1/2),
φ′(c) =
φ(1/2)− φ(0)
1/2
= 2φ(1/2),
since φ(0) = 0. Thus,
G′(1/2) = φ′(1/2)− φ′(c) > 0, c ∈ (0, 1/2)
since φ′(x) is strictly increasing on (0, 1). Then
F ′(1/2) = G′(1/2) − 2β > 0 for sufficiently small
β and thus 1/2 is unstable. On the other hand since
F (0) = β > 0, F (1) = −β < 0 there must be at least
two (symmetrically placed) equilibria, one in (0, 1/2),
and the other in (1/2, 1). Moreover, generically, these
equilibria will be stable, and hence the model leads to
dominance of one opinion for large N and large t.
Next, we provide examples with various conformity func-
tions φ and investigate the stable equilibria to predict
dominance or balance. We shall also check the predic-
tion from the stable equilibria of the ODE model against
computational results of the stationary probability dis-
tributions. We note that, there are two methods to com-
pute the stationary distributions. One is to use the for-
mulas (6) and (7) and the other is to use an ODE solver
to compute the solution to (5). For very large N values,
our numerical experiments suggest that using (6) and
(7) provide more accurate results compared to the ODE
solver. Hence, throughout this study, we refer to (6) and
(7) to verify our predictions from the stable equilibria of
(9).
Example 1 Consider the simplest example of φ(x) = x.
This is convex, but not strictly so. In this case, the rate
that an agent changes his/her opinion is nN+β. Using (9),
we can conclude that as N gets large XN (t) converges
to x(t), where
x˙(t) = β(1 − 2x(t)) (11)
Since this ODE has a unique equilibrium at x = 12 that is
globally attractive, regardless of spontaneity coefficient
β > 0, it is expected that the group will reach balance
of opinions as can be observed in Fig. 1. We note that
in Fig. 1(b) the bell shape curve becomes narrower as N
gets larger.
It is thus interesting to note that as long as β > 0, no
matter how small, one expects balance of opinions.
Fig. 1. Exact values of the stationary probabilities calculated
using (6) and (7) for φ(x) = x and N = 1000. (a) β = 5. (b)
β = 0.01.
Example 2Consider φ(x) = x2 which is strictly convex.
The limiting ODE is
x˙(t) = (1− 2x(t)) (x(t)2 − x(t) + β). (12)
It is easy to see that (12) has three possible equilibria;
x1 =
1
2 and x2,3 =
1
2 ±
√
1−4β
2 . Hence, based on the
choice of spontaneity coefficient β, different scenarios are
expected. When β ≥ 14 , the stable equilibrium is x1 = 12
and the model leads to balance of opinions. On the other
hand, when β < 14 , the stable equilibria are x2,3 and the
model leads to dominance. In Fig. 2(a) one can observe
that the model leads to balance of opinions for β = 5.
On the other hand, when β = 0.2, as can be seen in
Fig. 2(b), the model leads to dominance of one opinion.
Example 3 We consider φ(x) = 1 − x2 to explore the
impact of rebelliousness in our model. In this case, the
rate an agent changes his/her opinion is N
2−n2
N2 + β.
4
Fig. 2. Exact values of the stationary probabilities calculated
using (6) and (7) for φ(x) = x2 and N = 1000. (a) β = 5.
(b) β = 0.2.
Hence, as the number of agents with the opposite opin-
ion increases, the rate of opinion change decreases. The
limiting ODE for this model is
x˙(t) =
(
x(t)2 − x(t) − 1− β)(2x(t)− 1). (13)
One can see that (13) has a unique equilibrium at x = 12
regardless of the spontaneity coefficient β > 0. Thus, we
can conclude that the model leads to balance of opinions
as can also be observed in Fig. 3.
Example 4 Let φ(x) =
√
x which is concave. Then the
corresponding ODE is
x˙(t) = (1 − 2x(t))
( √
x(t)
√
1− x(t)√
1− x(t) +
√
x(t)
+ β
)
. (14)
We first observe that F is not C1 on [0, 1] and the fluid
limit theorem does not apply. Nevertheless, we proceed
heuristically to look for the stable equilibria. One can
observe that x = 1/2 is the only equilibrium for (14).
Thus, onemay expect that the model will lead to balance
of opinions regardless of the choice of the spontaneity
coefficient β as can be observed in Fig. 4.
Fig. 3. Exact values of the stationary probabilities calculated
using (6) for φ(x) = 1− x2 and and N = 500. (a) β = 7. (b)
β = 0.001.
Example 5 Consider the monotone increasing, convex
conformity function φ(x) = x1−x , so that the conformity
function is the ratio of the fraction of agents with oppo-
site opinion to those with the same opinion. Then, the
rate of change of one’s opinion is n/(N−n)+β. We note
that φ(x) has a singularity at x = 1 and that (3) does
not hold for i = 0, N , and hence the fluid limit theorem
does not hold. Nevertheless, we proceed heuristically to
consider F in (10) which is given by
F (x) = (β − 1)(1− 2x),
which has only one equilibrium x = 1/2 and it is (asymp-
totically) stable if and only if β > 1. Thus we expect
balance for β > 1. When β < 1, we expect dominance
of one opinion.
This heuristic is verified both by our numerical com-
putation of the stationary probabilities as well as the
asymptotic formulas for the stationary probabilities (6)
and (7) that we derive in Appendix A.
In Fig. 5, we present an example for β < 1 case. In this
experiment we use β = 0.2 and N = 100. Fig. 5. shows
5
Fig. 4. Exact values of the stationary probabilities calculated
using (6) and (7) for φ(x) =
√
x and N = 1000. (a) β = 10.
(b) β = 0.1.
Fig. 5. Asymptotic approximation π˜N when φ(x) = x
1−x
,
β = 0.2 and N = 100.
the asymptotic approximation π˜N = (π˜N1 , π˜
N
2 , . . . , π˜
N
N )
calculated in (A.13) As shown in Fig. 5 our model leads
to dominance of one opinion. On the other hand, an ex-
ample of β > 1 case is shown in Fig. 6 and it displays the
approximations for stationary probabilities, π˜N , calcu-
lated using (A.17). As seen in Fig. 6 the model leads to
balance of opinions.
Fig. 6. Asymptotic approximation for π˜N when φ(x) = x
1−x
,
β = 10 and N = 100.
4 Heterogeneous binary opinion dynamics
Let us consider the case where the group is heteroge-
neous. Namely, suppose we have m personality classes
of agents such that all agents within a class i (where
i = 1, . . . ,m) have the same personality (φi, βi), but
personalities differ among the classes. This results in
a Markov process model where the state is a vector
x = (x1, . . . , xm) where 0 ≤ xi ≤ Ni is the number of
class i agents who hold opinion 1 with Ni being the total
number of class i agents. We assume that the personal-
ities of agents is fixed in time, thus Ni is a constant for
each i and N = N1+ · · ·+Nm is the total number of all
agents. We note that during a time interval (t, t+ h] an
agent from class i will flip with probability
(φi(n/N) + βi)h+ o(h) h→ 0+,
where n is the total number of all agents who have the
opposite opinion to that of the given agent. We shall be
concerned with the case of large N with the fractions
ki = Ni/N within classes being held constant.
This results in a family of Markov process XN(t) which
undergo a jump ei or −ei for i = 1, . . . ,m (here ei ∈ Rm
is the vector with ith component equal to one and all
others equal to zero) with corresponding class i birth
and death rates given by
λNi (x) = φi
( |x|
N
)
(Ni − xi) + βi(Ni − xi),
µNi (x) = φi
(
1− |x|
N
)
xi + βixi,
(15)
where given the state x = (x1, . . . , xm) we denote by |x|
the total number of agents holding opinion 1:
|x| =
m∑
i=1
xi.
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We note that 0 ≤ xi ≤ Ni. We shall consider the nor-
malized process XN (t) = X
N (t)/N , where XN,i(t) is
the fraction of class i agents with opinion 1 where the
fraction is normalized by N and not Ni. We may write
λNi (x) = Nλ¯i
( x
N
)
,
µNi (x) = Nµ¯i
( x
N
)
where
λ¯i(x) = φi(|x|)(ki − xi) + βi(ki − xi),
µ¯i(x) = φi (1− |x|) xi + βixi, (16)
where as before |x| = x1 + . . . xm.
In the fluid limit, asN →∞, one expectsXN to converge
to x where x satisfies the ODE
x˙(t) = F (x(t)),
where the m dimensional vector field F is given by
Fi(x) = λ¯i(x)− µ¯i(x), i = 1, . . . ,m,
which simplifies to
Fi(x) = βi(ki−2xi)+φ(|x|)(ki−xi)−φ(1−|x|)xi (17)
for i = 1, . . . ,m.WhenN and t are both large, we expect
to see the peaks of the probability distribution of XN (t)
to occur near the stable equilibria of this ODE. We note
that x¯ = (k1/2, . . . , km/2) is always an equilibrium.
Example with two extreme personality classes
We consider the case of two extreme personality classes
(φi, βi) for i = 1, 2 where
φ1(ξ) = φ(ξ), β1 = 0,
φ2(ξ) = 0, β2 = β > 0,
(18)
where φ : [0, 1] → R is a monotonic function. We note
that class 1 corresponds to total conformity and class 2
corresponds to total spontaneity. Let us write k1 = 2k
(thus k is half the fraction of class 1) and thus k2 = 1−2k.
This results in
F1(x) = φ(x1 + x2)(2k − x1)− φ(1 − x1 − x2)x1,
F2(x) = β(1− 2k − 2x2).
(19)
At an equilibrium, clearly x2 =
1
2−k and x¯ = (k, 1/2−k)
is always an equilibrium. Additional equilibria are found
by solving the equation
F1(x) = φ(x1+
1
2
−k)(2k−x1)−φ(1
2
−x1+k)x1 (20)
for x1. We note that class 2 (spontaneous class) is always
expected to reach a balance since at an equilibrium x2 =
1−2k
2 =
k2
2 .
Theorem 2 Consider the group with two extreme per-
sonality classes (18) such that the derivative of confor-
mity function, φ′(x), is strictly increasing on (0, 1) and
the fraction of the class of conformists 2k > 2φ(1/2)φ′(1/2) .
Then the equilibrium x¯ = (k, 1/2 − k) is unstable and
hence the model (18) leads to dominance of one opinion
for large N and large t.
Proof 2 Note that it is sufficient to study the limiting
behavior of the class of conformists to conclude the whole
group’s behavior for large N and t. Next, we analyze the
stability of the equilibrium (k, 1/2− k). The Jacobian at
the equilibrium,
J(1/2− k, k) =
[
∂F1
∂x1
∂F1
∂x2
∂F2
∂x1
∂F2
∂x2
.
]
.
Since ∂F2∂x1 = 0, eigenvalues at the equilibrium are
ǫ1 =
∂F1
∂x1
, ǫ2 =
∂F2
∂x2
= −2β < 0,
where
ǫ1 = 2kφ
′(1/2)− 2φ(1/2).
Solving for k to study the sign of ǫ1, we conclude that
when 2k < 2φ(1/2)φ′(1/2) , ǫ1 < 0 and hence the equilibrium
(k, 1/2−k) is stable leading to balance for the conformists
and thus for the entire group.
However, when 2k > 2φ(1/2)φ′(1/2) , the equilibrium (k, 1/2−k)
is unstable. On the other hand, since 0 ≤ x1 + x2 ≤ 1,
at an equilibrium 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 12 + k where 0 < k < 1/2.
We note that there are no other equilibrium points except
those on the line x2 = 1− 2k as shown in Fig. 7.
Moreover, from (20) one can conclude that F1(0,
1
2−k) =
2kφ(12 − k) > 0, F1(12 + k, 12 − k) = (k − 12 )φ(1) < 0.
Thus, there have to be two other equilibria on the line
x2 =
1
2 − k that are symmetrically placed. For one of
such equilibrium point x1 ∈ (0, k) and for the other x1 ∈
(k, 12 + k). Moreover, generically, these equilibria will be
stable and conformists as well as the entire group will
reach dominance of one opinion for large N and t. Table
1 summarizes the limiting behaviors of the classes with
respect to the fraction of class populations.
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x1
x2
1
1
1− 2k
2k
1
2
− k x2 =
1
2
− k
k
Fig. 7. Phase portrait of the system X˙ = F with (19). The
equilibria is on the line x2 =
1
2
−k and (k, 1
2
−k) is always an
equilibrium. Values of x2 evolves towards the line x2 =
1
2
−k
for any initial condition and regardless of x1 values.
Table 1
Limiting behavior of group classes with respect to the frac-
tion of conformists, 2k
2k < 2φ(1/2)
φ′(1/2)
2k > 2φ(1/2)
φ′(1/2)
Class 1 (conformists) balance dominance
Class 2 (spontaneous) balance balance
Whole group balance dominance
Example 1 Consider φ(x) = x. The corresponding
ODE has a unique equilibrium (k, 1/2−k) and it is stable
(ǫ1 = 2k − 1, ǫ2 = −2β). Thus regardless of the choice
of β and the fraction of the class of conformists, 2k, this
model leads to balance in both classes. Therefore, the
whole group reaches balance.
Example 2 Let φ(x) = x2. In this case, when con-
formists are less than 50% of the population, 2k < 12 , the
corresponding ODE has only one equilibria (k, 1/2− k)
and it is stable (ǫ1 = 2k− 1/2). Thus, conformists reach
balance as well as the spontaneous class, and hence the
entire group reaches balance for large N and large t. On
the other hand, when conformists are more than 50% of
the population, 2k > 12 , the equilibrium (k, 1/2 − k) is
unstable and the class of conformists reaches to domi-
nance of one opinion. In fact, the other two equilibria
are (k ±
√
4k−1
2 , 1/2− k) and the stability analysis sug-
gests that these equilibrium points are stable. Hence,
the model leads to dominance for the whole group. One
Example is given in Fig. 8 where probabilities are com-
puted using Monte Carlo simulations of 10.000 trajecto-
ries. Here, the total number of agents is N = 120 with
N1 = 100 (2k = 5/6) being the population of the con-
formists where φ(x) = x2 and spontaneity coefficient
β = 0.02.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a simple binary model where agents
hold an opinion from the set {0, 1} at any time t ≥ 0. An
Fig. 8. Empirical probability mass function for the number
of agents with opinion 1 at time T = 100 for the case of two
extreme classes with φ(x) = x2 and β = 0.02.
agent flips his/her opinion based on the number of agents
with opinion 1 in the entire population. The influence of
the group on an agent is determined by his/her person-
ality. A personality is formed by a conformity function
φ and a spontaneity coefficient β. When all agents in
the group share the same personality, we call the group
homogeneous.
Initially, focusing on a homogeneous group, we analyzed
the long time probabilities for a large population size for
different personality characteristics of the group. The
question of what personality characteristics lead to dom-
inance of one opinion was studied. We found that the
shape of the conformity function, namely strict convex-
ity or lack thereof, seems to be an important determin-
ing factor in whether dominance of one opinion occurs
for sufficiently small β.
We extended our model to a heterogeneous group, where
the group consists of different personality classes. In
particular, when the group is formed by two extreme
classes, complete conformity and complete spontaneity,
the dominance of group opinion is analyzed. In this ex-
ample, we found that the fraction of the pure conformists
was a key determining factor of dominance along with
the strict convexity of φ.
References
[1] Marco Bartolozzi, Derek Bruce Leinweber, and
Anthony William Thomas. Stochastic opinion formation in
scale-free networks. Physical Review E, 72(4):046113, 2005.
[2] Vincent D Blondel, Julien M Hendrickx, and John N
Tsitsiklis. Continuous-time average-preserving opinion
dynamics with opinion-dependent communications. SIAM
Journal on Control and Optimization, 48(8):5214–5240, 2010.
[3] Claudio Castellano, Santo Fortunato, and Vittorio Loreto.
Statistical physics of social dynamics. Reviews of modern
physics, 81(2):591, 2009.
8
[4] Francesca Ceragioli and Paolo Frasca. Continuous and
discontinuous opinion dynamics with bounded confidence.
Nonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications, 13(3):1239–
1251, 2012.
[5] Marta S de la Lama, Juan M Lo´pez, and Horacio S
Wio. Spontaneous emergence of contrarian-like behaviour
in an opinion spreading model. EPL (Europhysics Letters),
72(5):851, 2005.
[6] Morris H DeGroot. Reaching a consensus. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 69(345):118–121, 1974.
[7] Andrea Ellero, Giovanni Fasano, and Annamaria Sorato.
Stochastic model of agent interaction with opinion leaders.
Physical Review E, 87(4):042806, 2013.
[8] Stewart N Ethier and Thomas G Kurtz. Markov processes:
characterization and convergence, volume 282. John Wiley
& Sons, 2009.
[9] John RP French Jr. A formal theory of social power.
Psychological review, 63(3):181, 1956.
[10] Noah E Friedkin and Eugene C Johnsen. Social influence and
opinions. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 15(3-4):193–
206, 1990.
[11] Serge Galam. Modeling the forming of public opinion:
an approach from sociophysics. Global Economics and
Management Review, 18(1):2–11, 2013.
[12] Rainer Hegselmann, Ulrich Krause, et al. Opinion dynamics
and bounded confidence models, analysis, and simulation.
Journal of artificial societies and social simulation, 5(3),
2002.
[13] Julien M Hendrickx and Alex Olshevsky. On symmetric
continuum opinion dynamics. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 54(5):2893–2918, 2016.
[14] Richard A Holley and Thomas M Liggett. Ergodic theorems
for weakly interacting infinite systems and the voter model.
The annals of probability, pages 643–663, 1975.
[15] Janusz A Ho lyst, Krzysztof Kacperski, and Frank Schweitzer.
Phase transitions in social impact models of opinion
formation. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications, 285(1):199–210, 2000.
[16] Peng Jia, Anahita MirTabatabaei, Noah E Friedkin, and
Francesco Bullo. Opinion dynamics and the evolution of
social power in influence networks. SIAM review, 57(3):367–
397, 2015.
[17] Thomas G Kurtz. Limit theorems and diffusion
approximations for density dependent markov chains.
In Stochastic Systems: Modeling, Identification and
Optimization, I, pages 67–78. Springer, 1976.
[18] JAHO Lyst, Krzysztof Kacperski, and Frank Schweitzer.
Social impact models of opinion dynamics. Annual reviews
of computational physics, 9:253–273, 2002.
[19] Mauro Mobilia, A Petersen, and Sidney Redner. On the
role of zealotry in the voter model. Journal of Statistical
Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2007(08):P08029, 2007.
[20] Piotr Nyczka and Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron. Anticonformity
or independence??insights from statistical physics. Journal
of Statistical Physics, 151(1-2):174–202, 2013.
[21] Filippo Palombi and Simona Toti. Stochastic dynamics of the
multi-state voter model over a network based on interacting
cliques and zealot candidates. Journal of Statistical Physics,
156(2):336–367, 2014.
[22] HL Royden and PM Fitzpatrick. Real analysis. 4th, 2010.
[23] Maxi San Miguel, Victor M Eguiluz, Raul Toral, and
Konstantin Klemm. Binary and multivariate stochastic
models of consensus formation. Computing in Science &
Engineering, 7(6):67–73, 2005.
[24] Johannes J Schneider. The influence of contrarians and
opportunists on the stability of a democracy in the sznajd
model. International Journal of Modern Physics C,
15(05):659–674, 2004.
[25] Serap Tay Stamoulas and Muruhan Rathinam. Convergence,
stability, and robustness of multidimensional opinion
dynamics in continuous time. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 56(3):1938–1967, 2018.
[26] K Sznajd-Weron, M Tabiszewski, and Andre´ M Timpanaro.
Phase transition in the sznajd model with independence.
EPL (Europhysics Letters), 96(4):48002, 2011.
[27] Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron and Jozef Sznajd. Opinion
evolution in closed community. International Journal of
Modern Physics C, 11(06):1157–1165, 2000.
[28] Ge´rard Weisbuch, Guillaume Deffuant, Fre´de´ric Amblard,
and Jean-Pierre Nadal. Meet, discuss, and segregate!
Complexity, 7(3):55–63, 2002.
[29] Ercan Yildiz, Asuman Ozdaglar, Daron Acemoglu, Amin
Saberi, and Anna Scaglione. Binary opinion dynamics with
stubborn agents. ACM Transactions on Economics and
Computation, 1(4):19, 2013.
[30] Damia´n H Zanette and Santiago Gil. Opinion spreading and
agent segregation on evolving networks. Physica D: Nonlinear
Phenomena, 224(1-2):156–165, 2006.
A Asymptotic approximations in Example 5
In order to obtain an approximation for the values of
πNn in (6) and (7) for large N , we first approximate R
N
n
given by (8) and then acquire an approximation for the
sum SN =
∑N
k=0 R
N
k . For n = 1, 2, . . . , N , we may write
1
N
ln(RNn ) =
1
N
n∑
j=1
ln
(
λ¯(
j − 1
N
)
)
− 1
N
n∑
j=1
ln
(
µ¯(
j
N
)
)
.
(A.1)
The following lemma will help us to understand the right
hand side of (A.1) asymptotically.
Lemma 1 Let h : [0, 1] → R be a C2 function on its
domain. Consider the partition 0 = x0 < x1 < . . . <
xN = 1 with xk − xk−1 = 1N . Consider x = nN be fixed.
Then, as N →∞
N
∫ x
0
h(t) dt−
n∑
k=1
h(xk−1)→ h(x) − h(0)
2
, (A.2)
n∑
k=1
h(xk)−N
∫ x
0
h(t) dt→ h(x) − h(0)
2
. (A.3)
Proof 3 Using Taylor expansion of h(t), t ∈ [xk−1, xk]
about xk−1, we may write
h(t)−h(xk−1) = h′(xk−1)(t−xk−1)+1
2
h′′(ξk(t))(t−xk−1)2,
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where ξk(t) ∈ (xk−1, t). Integrating both sides of the equa-
tion above on the interval [xk−1, xk],
ek :=
∫ xk
xk−1
h(t) dt− h(xk−1)(xk − xk−1)
=
1
2N2
h′(xk−1) + Tk,N ,
where Tk,N =
∫ xk
xk−1
1
2h
′′(ξk(t))(t−xk−1)2 dt. Now, sum-
ming over k = 1, . . . , n we reach
n∑
k=1
ek =
∫ x
0
h(t) dt−
n∑
k=1
h(xk−1)
1
N
(A.4)
=
n∑
k=1
1
2N2
h′(xk−1) +
n∑
k=1
Tk,N .
Consider the right hand side of (A.4). As N →∞,
N
(
n∑
k=1
1
2N2
h′(xk−1)
)
→ 1
2
∫ x
0
h′(t) dt =
h(x) − h(0)
2
.
(A.5)
Moreover, since h′′(x) is continuous and hence bounded
on [0, 1], for some M <∞ we may write
n∑
k=1
Tk,N ≤
n∑
k=1
∫ xk
xk−1
1
2
M(t− xk−1)2 dt =
n∑
k=1
M
6N3
.
Hence, for N →∞,
N
n∑
k=1
Tk,N ≤
n∑
k=1
M
6N2
→ 0. (A.6)
Considering (A.4) together with (A.5) and (A.6), wemay
write
N
(
1
N
n∑
k=1
h(xk−1)
)
∼ N
∫ x
0
h(t) dt−h(x)− h(0)
2
, N →∞.
This proves (A.2). Similarly, one can easily obtain (A.3).
Since ln(λ¯(x)) and ln(µ¯(x)) areC2 on their domain, con-
sidering (A.1) in the light of Lemma 1, we reach that for
large N ,
1
N
ln(RNn ) ∼
∫ x
0
ln
(
λ¯(t)
µ¯(t)
)
dt− 1
N
{
1
2
ln
(
λ¯(x)µ¯(x)
λ¯(0)µ¯(0)
)}
.
(A.7)
Let us define
F (x) :=
∫ x
0
ln
(
λ¯(t)
µ¯(t)
)
dt, H(x) :=
1
2
ln
(
λ¯(x)µ¯(x)
λ¯(0)µ¯(0)
)
.
(A.8)
Then,
RNn ∼ exp
(
NF (
n
N
)−H( n
N
)
)
, N →∞.
Therefore,
SN =
N∑
n=0
RNn ∼
N∑
n=0
exp
(
NF (
n
N
)−H( n
N
))
)
, N →∞.
(A.9)
We note that
F (x) =
∫ x
0
ln
(
(1− β)t+ β
(β − 1)t+ 1
)
dt, (A.10)
H(x) =
1
2
ln
(
1 +
(1 − β)2
β
x(1− x)
)
.
Based on the choice of β one can observe that F takes
its maximum value either in the middle of interval [0, 1]
or at its end points. One can reach this conclusion by
examining F (x) in (A.10). In fact, the integrand, F ′(x),
is an increasing function with zero at x = 12 if β < 1 and
a decreasing function with zero at x = 12 if β > 1. Next,
using Laplace’s method, we reach an approximation for
SN (A.9).
We first consider the case when β < 1. In this case F
(A.10) takes its maximum at the end points of the inter-
val [0, 1]. Since the largest contribution to the sum SN
(A.9) comes from some ǫ > 0 neighborhood of the max-
imum and F is symmetric, we have SN ∼ 2SNǫ where
SNǫ =
ǫN∑
n=0
RNn ∼
ǫN∑
n=0
eNF (
n
N
)−H( n
N
).
Using Taylor expansion of F ( nN ) andH(
n
N ) about 0 and
ignoring O( 1N ) terms inside the exponent, we have
SNǫ ∼
ǫN∑
n=0
e{NF (0)+F
′(0)n−H(0)} =
ǫN∑
n=0
(eF
′(0))n.
Note that F (0) = 0 and H(0) = 0 by (A.10). The series
above convergent since F ′(0) = lnβ < 0. Thus
SN ∼ 2SNǫ ∼
2
1− eF ′(0) =
2
1− β . (A.11)
Thus,
πN0 =
1
SN
∼ 1− β
2
. (A.12)
Moreover, using the explicit definitions of F and
H in (A.10), and since πNn ∼ πN0 e{NF (
n
N
)−H( n
N
)},
10
n = 1, . . . , N , we have
πNn ∼ πN0
[
n+ (N − n)β
βn+ (N − n)
]2n [
n+ (N − n)β
βN
] 2βN−1+β
2(1−β)
[
βn+ (N − n)
N
] 2N−1+β
2(1−β)
.(A.13)
When β > 1, the function F attains its unique maxi-
mum in the middle of the interval [0,1]. Similarly, we can
approximate the sum SN by the ǫ neighborhood of the
maximum, x = 12 . Assuming N is odd, S
N ∼ SNǫ and
SNǫ ∼ 2
N+1
2 +ǫN∑
N+1
2
exp
{
NF (
n
N
)−H( n
N
)
}
= 2
ǫN∑
m=0
exp
{
NF (
m
N
+
1
2N
+
1
2
)−H(m
N
+
1
2N
+
1
2
)
}
,
where m = n − N+12 . Now, using Taylor expansion of
both F ( nN ) and H(
n
N ) about
1
2 , ignoring the terms of
O( 1N2 ), and considering that F
′(12 ) = 0, H
′(12 ) = 0 by
(A.10) we have,
SNǫ ∼ 2 exp {NF (
1
2
)−H(1
2
)}
ǫN∑
m=0
exp
{
F ′′(12 )
2
(m+ 12 )
2
N
}
.
Let Iǫ(N) =
∑ǫN
m=0 exp
{
F ′′( 12 )
2
(m+ 12 )
2
N
}
. Then,
Iǫ(M) =
ǫM2∑
m=0
exp
{
(
−K
2
)
(
m+ 12
M
)2}
,
where K = −F ′′(12 ) and M =
√
N . Thus, for large M
1
M
Iǫ(M) =
1
M
ǫM2∑
m=0
exp
{
−K
2
(
m+ 12
M
)2}
∼
∫ ǫM
0
exp
{−K
2
t2
}
dt. (A.14)
Using the dominated convergence theorem [22], we can
show that∫ ǫM
0
exp
{−K
2
t2
}
dt→
∫ ∞
0
exp
{−K
2
t2
}
dt as M →∞.
Note that the integral above is a Gaussian integral∫∞
0 e
−ax2 dx = 12
√
π
a with a =
K
2 . Hence,
Iǫ(N) ∼ 1
2
√
2πN
|F ′′(12 )|
.
This gives us the approximation
SN ∼ SNǫ ∼ e{NF (
1
2 )−H( 12 )}
√
2πN
|F ′′(12 )|
.
Using definitions of F and H in (A.10),
SN ∼
√
2Nπβ
(β2 − 1)e
NF ( 12 ), (A.15)
Hence,
π0 ∼
√
(β2 − 1)
2Nπβ
e−NF (
1
2 ). (A.16)
where F
(
1
2
)
=
∫ 1
2
0
ln( λ¯(t)µ¯(t) ) dt =
[
2(1+β)ββ
(1+β)(1+β)
] N
1−β
. Simi-
larly, for n = 1, 2, . . . , N , we obtain
πNn ∼ πN0
[
n+ (N − n)β
βn+ (N − n)
]2n [
n+ (N − n)β
βN
] 2βN−1+β
2(1−β)
[
βn+ (N − n)
N
] 2N−1+β
2(1−β)
. (A.17)
In order to check the accuracy of our asymptotic ap-
proximations, we calculate the relative error E =
(E1, . . . , EN ) defined as Ei =
|πNi −π˜Ni |
|πN
i
| for i = 0, . . . , N ,
where πNi represents the exact calculations (6), (7), and
π˜N is the asymptotic approximations (A.13), (A.17).
We observed that the relative error is in the order of
10−3 and decreases as N increases.
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